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EDITORIAL NOTES
THE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
The student section, as well as the leading article section of
this issue of the Quarterly is devoted to problems of state consti-
tutional law. It might also be noted that bibliographies will be
found at the end of each of the leading articles. These bibli-
ographies contain suggestions by the authors of additional refer-
ences in the particular field.
THE SCHOOL OF LAW
The law school program is being set up for the duration of
the war on a year-around basis. Students who enter the school
in February, June, or September, may by continuous attendance
graduate in two calendar years from time of entrance. The sum-
mer of 1942 is to be divided into two sessions. In the first ses-
sion, from June 15 to July 23, the following courses will be of-
fered: Contracts I, Property I, Partnership, Federal Jurisdic-
tion and Procedure, and Municipal Corporations. Contracts II,
Property II, Quasi-contracts, Legislation, and Damages will be
offered in the second session, which will last from July 27 to
September 3.
NOTE AND COMMENT
THE MISSOURI PROVISION FOR PERIODIC
CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION
Article XV, section 4 of the Missouri Constitution provides
that there shall be a submission of the question, "Shall there be
a convention to revise and amend the Constitution?" at a special
election to be held in 1921 and at the general election next follow-
ing the lapse of twenty years and at twenty-year periods there-
after.1 By the clear meaning of the section a submission is called
1. The exact language of art. XV, §4 is as follows: "The question 'Shall
there be a convention to revise and amend the Constitution,' shall be sub-
mitted to the electors of the state at a special election to be held on the first
Tuesday in August, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-one, and at each
general election next ensuing the lapse of twenty successive years since the
last previous submission thereof, and in case a majority of electors voting
for and against the calling of a convention shall vote for a convention,
the governor shall issue writs of election to the sheriffs of the different
counties, ordering the election of delegates, and the assembling of such con-
vention, as is provided in the preceding section."
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for at the general election of 1942. This section is of peculiar
importance because some doubt has arisen as to the nature of the
provision and the sanctions behind the constitutional language.
It has been suggested that the secretary of state is not required
to submit the question because the general assembly has ad-
journed without authorizing the submission.2 The secretary of
state publicly declared that he would submit the question regard-
less of legislative action.3 It is submitted that the secretary of
state is correct in his position since he may not be restrained
from such action by injunction,4 and mandamus would lie to com-
pel him to submit the question.5
2. Faust, Popular Sovereignty (1942) 27 WASHINGTON U. LAW QuAR-
Tzmy 812.
8. Ibid.
4. "* * * The courts will not interfere by injunction to restrain officers
of a state from compliance with a law of the state requiring the performance
of a public duty at their hands." High, Injunctions (4th ed. 1905) 1340;
People ex rel. O'Reilly v. Mills (1902) 30 Colo. 262, 70 Pac. 322 (Refusal'
to enjoin secretary of state from submitting constitutional amendment be-
cause the duty was enjoined by law); Fleming v. Gutherie (1889) 32 W. Va.
1, 9 S. E. 23, 3 L. R. A. 53 (Refusal to issue a writ of prohibition against
a mandamus action on grounds of an injunction pending because the in-junction would not lie to restrain a duty compelled by law). It is apparent
that this rule is applicable to the present discussion because, if there is an
unqualified duty to submit the question at a particular time, the courts
may not restrain its submission.
A number of cases have held that the courts may not by injunction re-
strain the holding of an election even though it is without authority of law.
State ex rel. Allen v. Dawson (1920) 284 Mo. 427, 224 S. W. 824; 4 Pomeroy,
Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed. 1919) §§1753-1755, and cases cited there-
under. The courts based this rule on the ground that no property right was
sought to be protected; hence equity had no jurisdiction. However, Missouri,
along with many other states, will allow an injunction to prevent an un-
authorized election on the ground that the taxpayer has a right to prevent
the waste of public funds in a useless election. This view was taken in
Baum v. City of St. Louis (1938) 343 Mo. 738, 123 S. W. (2d) 48 in which
the court enjoined the election commissioners from holding an election
which was not authorized by law and which would cost the taxpayers
$200,000. Note other cases in which the amount of expense has been con-
trolling; thus where only a negligible cost would result from the election
or where the election would only require an addition to the ballot the in-junction has beeen refused. Brumfield v. Brock (Miss. 1932) 142 So. 745,
747; State ex rel. Fulton v. Zimmerman (1926) 191 Wis. 10, 210 N. W. 381.
The above discussion applies only when the election is not authorized by
law. It is submitted that under art. XV, §4 of the Missouri constitution
there is a clear authorization of the submission; hence regardless of the
amount of interest the injunction would not lie.
5. It is well established in Missouri that a public officer may be compelled
to perform a mandatory and ministerial duty by mandamus. In State ex
rel. Donnell v. Osburn (1941) 347 Mo. 469, 147 S. W. (2d) 1065, 1069 the
court stated: "It is our judgment that the duty * * * imposed on the
Speaker is clear, peremptory and ministerial and therefore one which may
be directed by mandamus." In Bakersfield News v. Ozark County (1936)
388 Mo. 519, 522, 92 S. W. (2d) 603 the court stated: "If a public officer
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The fundamental nature of state constitutions requires that
there be constant revision in response to the popular will.0 It
fails to perform mandatory, ministerial duties, he may be compelled to do
so by mandamus." See: State ex rel. Register of Lands v. Secretary of
State (1863) 33 Mo. 293; State ex rel. Broadhead v. Berg (1882) 76 Mo.
136, 142; Dreyfus v. Lonergan (1898) 73 Mo. App. 336; State ex rel.
Schade v. Russell (1908) 131 Mo. App. 638, 110 S. W. 667; State ex rel.
Byrd v. Knott (Mo. App. 1934) 75 S. W. (2d) 86; State ex rel. Allen v.
Deatherage (Mo. App. 1938) 120 S. W. (2d) 193; Note (1936) 20 ST. LouIs
LAW REVIEW 346, 355; Comment (1941) 26 WASHINGTON U. LAW QuAn-
TERLY 442.
Mandamus has been held applicable to compel a recalcitrant secretary
of state to obey constitutional and legislative commands. In State ex rel.
Stoakes v. Roach (Mo. 1916) 190 S. W. 277, 278 the court stated: "This
court has repeatedly declared that * * * [the secretary of state] is purely
a ministerial officer and as such may be compelled to do what he ought to
do." State ex. rel. Register of Lands v. Secretary of State (1863) 33 Mo.
293; State ex rel. Jones v. Cook (1903) 174 Mo. 100, 73 S. W. 489; State ex
rel. Maring v. Swanger (1908) 212 Mo. 472, 111 S. W. 7; State ex rel. Lashly
v. Becker (1921) 290 Mo. 560, 235 S. W. 1017. See also the following cases
from other jurisdictions: State ex rel. Fleming v. Crawford (1891) 28 Fla.
441, 10 So. 118, 14 L. R. A. 253; Davis v. Crawford (1928) 95 Fla. 438, 116
So. 41; Thompson v. Vaughan (1916) 192 Mich. 512, 159 N. W. 65; Scott
v. Vaughan (1918) 202 Mich. 629, 168 N. W. 709; State ex rel. Peterson v.
Hall (1919) 43 N. D. 628, 176 N. W. 117; Looney v. Leeper (1930) 145 Okla.
202, 292 Pac. 365; State ex rel. Smith v. Kozer (1924) 112 Ore. 286, 229
Pac. 679; Taylor v. King (1925) 284 Pa. 235, 130 Atl. 407; 38 C. J. 666.
In State ex rel. Wineman v. Dahl (1896) 6 N. D. 81, 68 N. W. 418, it was
held that the secretary of state could be compelled to submit the question of
calling a constitutional convention. In the Dahl case the constitutional pro-
vision required that the legislature authorize the submission. After the
legislature had done so the secretary of state was compelled by mandamus
to submit the question. The constitution required that the legislature deter-
mine when the question was to be submitted, whereas art. XV, §4 of the
Missouri constitution does not leave that determination to the legislature.
If mandamus is applicable where the legislature has authorized the submis-
sion it is apparent that the writ would issue when the same duty is com-
manded by the constitution itself.
The people, speaking through their constitution, have commanded that
the question be submitted at the 1942 general election. No individual could
conceivably have a special or particular interest in having a submission;
hence, the interest must be one held by the citizens of Missouri in common.
It is apparent that the secretary of state owes his duty to the general public.
It has been held that a private citizen, without special interest, may bring
mandamus to compel the performance of a duty owed to the general
public. The leading Missouri case on this point is State ex rel. Francis v.
Wear (1888) 95 Mo. 44, 8 S. W. 1, in which the court stated: " * , * Where
a public right is involved, and the object is to enforce a public duty, the
people are regarded as the real party, and in such case the relator need not
show any special interest in the result, * * *. The great weight of authority
supports this view." See: Concurring opinion of Sherwood, J., in State ex
rel. Thomas v. Hoblitzelle (1885) 85 Mo. 620, 625; State ex rel. Morris v.
Railroad (1885) 86 Mo. 13, 16; State ex rel. Barricelli v. Noonan (1894) 59
Mo. App. 524, 530; State ex rel. Rutledge v. School Board (1895) 131 Mo. 505,
514, 33 5. W. 3; State ex rel. Black v. Wilson (1911) 158 Mo. App. 105, 119,
139 S. W. 705; State ex rel. Faust v. Thomas (1926) 313 Mo. 160, 165, 282
S. W. 34 ; State ex rel. Johnson v. Sevier (1936) 339 Mo. 483, 487, 98 S. W.
(2d) 677.
6. Graves, American State Government (rev. ed. 1941) 61.
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is almost axiomatic that the longevity of a constitution depends
upon its flexibility.7 This quality has been achieved in the Federal
Constitution by the general terms in which the document is
written and by judicial interpretation; state constitutions, on
the other hand, have been more detailed and therefore relatively
inflexible.' For this reason states have had to look to amendment
and revision to bring their constitutions into line with constantly
changing conditions. There must be a process of revision which
is readily responsive to the popular will; this in turn makes
periodic revision both desirable and necessary.
The force of these considerations has been clearly illustrated
by the development of the Missouri constitution.9 Under the
procedure provided before 1920, which left constitutional revi-
sion totally dependent upon legislative acquiescence, 0 numerous
problems were encountered. Amendments were adopted with
great difficulty and the legislature under article XV, section 3
consistently refused to submit the question of a constitutional
convention to the people for popular vote." Because of legislative
reluctance to submit the question, in 1920 the people of Missouri
by initiative wrote article XV, section 4 into our organic law.1
2
7. Ibid.
8. Id. at 54.
9. The Missouri Constitution of 1820 had no provision for any sort of
revision nor was there popular referendum of amendments. (Mo. Const.
1820) Amendments were entirely legislative; the general assembly proposed
amendments by a two-thirds vote and the next general assembly ratified the
amendment by a two-thirds vote. In 1865 popular amendment was writ-
ten into the constitution and it was provided that the question of whether
or not a constituional convention should be called should be submitted to the
people. (Mo. Const. (1865) art. XII, §§2, 3) Determination as to when the
question should be submitted was left entirely up to legislative discretion.
(Mo. Const. (1865) art. XII, §3) This procedure was restated in the
constitution of 1875. (Mo. Const. (1875) art. XV, §3) In 1920 the 1865
procedure was again reaffirmed and it remains art. XV, §3 of the present
constitution. But in 1920 by initiative art. XV, §4 was ratified; this pro-
vided for periodic popular vote on the question of whether a constitutional
convention should be called.
10. See note 9, supra.
11. William W. Hollingsworth, The New Constitution of Missouri (1924)
9 ST. Louis LAW REVIW 71-72 states as follows: "Since the adoption of the
present constitution [Mo. Const. (1875)] there have been proposed approxi-
mately one hundred amendments, about twenty of which have been adopted.
"For more than a decade a movement for a convention to revise the
constitution of Missouri has been under way, but there was no well-organized
effort before 1918. Each successive session of the legislature was prevailed
upon to submit the question to the voters of the state, but without avail.
Finally the New Constitution Association of Missouri took form and began
to function. Since the legislature refused to submit the matter to the voters,
it was decided that the next best step was to change by means of the initia-
tive the method of calling constitutional conventions."
12. Ibid.
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Article XV, section 4 does not name the secretary of state but
merely states that the "question * * * shall be submitted * * *
at each general election next ensuing the lapse of twenty suc-
cessive years since the last previous submission thereof, * * *.""
This language clearly indicates that the submission was meant
to be periodic, recurring, and automatic.1 ' From this it is argu-
able that by fair implication the section appropriates the election
machinery for the submission of similar issues.15 Since the sub-
mission of similar questions is enjoined upon the secretary of
state16 it may be suggested that this duty also rests upon that
official. However, it is not necessary to base the duty on implica-
tion because the legislature has specifically provided that the duty
of submitting such questions should rest upon the secretary of
state. R. S. Mo. (1939) §11676 provides:
Whenever a proposed constitutional amendment or any
other question is to be submitted to the people of the state
for popular vote, the secretary of state shall duly, and not
less than twenty days before the election, certify the same
to the clerk of each county court of the state, * * * 17
It is apparent that the submission called for under article XV,
section 4 comes within the above language. Additional sections
provide for the placing of the question upon the ballots,18 the
form of the ballots, 9 and the method of voting.20 The language
13. Mo. Const. (1875) art. XV, §4.
14. Dean Isidor Loeb, writing immediately before the ratification of art.
XV, §4 interpreted the provision as requiring that the question " * * be
automatically submitted to the voters." Loeb, Constitutions and Constitu-
tional Conventions in Missouri (1922) 237.
15. In the Prohibitory-Amendment Cases (1881) 24 Kan. 700 the court
held that the language, "at the general election," in a provision for the sub-
mission of an amendment, appropriated the general election law; the court
pointed out that the proposition was meant to be submitted in accordance
with the ordinary election procedure in similar submissions.
In State ex rel. Goodin v. Thoman (1872) 10 Kan. 191 the court held
that the constitutional provision, "There shall be elected * * * a districtjudge, who shall hold his office for the term of four years, ** *,1 implied
that there should be an election at the general election even though there
was no express provision for its submission. The court stated at p. 197:
"The constitution is the paramount law. It is above the legislatures and
courts. It was intended as a paramount rule, to be changed only by the
people in their sovereign capacity. * * * As between two constructions * * *
that which gives stability and force is preferred to that which makes it
simply an expression of desire, subject to the omissions or caprices of each
succeeding legislature. The manifest purpose of the provision was to secure
to the people at stated intervals the opportunity of changing the incum-
bents."
16. Mo. Const. (1875) art. IV, §57.
17. Italics added.
18. R. S. Mo. (1939) §11596.
19. R. S. Mo. (1939) §11680.
20. Ibid.
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of article XV, section 4, the customary procedure in the sub-
mission of analogous questions, and direct statutory enactment
compel the view that the duty of submitting the question is
directed to the secretary of state.
The section by its obvious and ordinary meaning2' directs a
mandatory and peremptory duty. The provision is couched in
mandatory language; it is provided that the question "shall" be
submitted.2 2 "Shall" is a peremptory word in common usage,
23
and it is customarily used to express a constitutional mandate
2 4
This language stands in violent contrast to that used in article
XV, section 3 which provides that the legislature "may" authorize
a vote by the people.2 5 The apparent difference between the
"may" of this section and the "shall" of article XV, section 4
cannot be said to be without significance. The framers in their
careful selection of words have used a word of command in
article XV, section 4 whereas permission and discretion was
rested in the legislature by use of the word, "may," in article
21. The Missouri Supreme Court has stated many times that in con-
stitutional construction the words must be given their ordinary and obvious
meaning. State ex rel. Barrett v. Hitchcock (1911) 241 Mo. 433, 146 S. W. 40;
State ex rel. Buck v. St. L. & S. F. R. R. (1915) 263 Mo. 689, 174 S. W. 64;
Elsberry Drainage Dist. v. Winkelmeyer (1919) 278 Mo. 268, 212 S. W. 893;
State ex rel. Otto v. Kansas City (1925) 310 Mo. 542, 582, 276 S. W.
889. In State ex rel. Heimberger v. Board of Curators (1916) 268 Mo.
598, 610, 188 S. W. 128, the court stated: "When the words used themselves
permit of no doubt as to the meaning, that ends the matter. There is no
room for construction."
22. Mo. Const. (1875) art. XV, §4.
23. In Oakland Paving Co. v. Hilton (1886) 69 Cal. 479, 11 Pac. 3, 9,
the court stated that the words "shall be" in a constitution are words of com-
mand. The court stated: "Such is their natural and ordinary meaning.
They are not * * * directory * * * but mandatory and peremptory, exacting
compliance with and obedience to them, and prohibitory of any action con-
flicting with them." In Chenoweth v. Chambers (1917) 33 Cal. App. 104,
164 Pac. 428, 430, the court stated: "You 'shall' or they 'shall' means, I
will compel you or them to act. * * * Consequently you (he or they) 'shall,'
expresses commands * * *." This rule was followed by the Missouri Su-
preme Court in State ex rel. Donnell v. Osburn (1941) 347 Mo. 469, 147
S. W. (2d) 1065 in which it was held that art. V, §3 of the Missouri
constitution, which provides that the speaker "shall" open and publish, is
a peremptory and mandatory provision. See also: Coleman v. Eutau (1908)
157 Ala. 327, 47 So. 703; Varney v. Justice (1888) 86 Ky. 596, 6 S. W.
457, 459; State ex rel. Gouge v. Burrow (1907) 119 Tenn. 376, 104 S. W.
526, 529, 14 Ann. Cas. 809; Baer v. Gore (1916) 79 W. Va. 50, 90 S. E. 530,
581.
24. Mo. Const. (1875) art. XI, §7; art. XI, §10; art. XI, §11; art. XI,
§12.
25. Mo. Const. (1875) art. XV, §3 provides as follows: "The general
assembly may at any time authorize by law that a vote of the electors of the
state be taken upon the question, 'Shall there be a convention to revise and
amend the Constitution,' * * *."
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XV, section 3.26 Moreover the history of the former section27
compels the view that it was meant to be mandatory.28
It is obvious that the framers intended that .the duty enjoined
by article XV, section 4 be non-discretionary and ministerial ;20
the plain and ordinary language of the section 0 designates what
question shall be submitted3l and when it shall be submitted.32
Furthermore little discretion is permitted as to how the question
is to be submitted. Statutes have provided specific directions as
to the proper mode of procedure.33 Yet even if it were to be
found that there is discretion as to certain details in the submis-
sion it is apparent that the determination as to whether the
question shall or shall not be submitted is out of the hands of
the secretary of state.3 4
26. It is a well established rule of constitutional construction that the
intent of the framers and ratifiers should be carried out. In State ex rel.
Litson v. McGowan (1897) 138 Mo. 187, 192, 32 S. W. 771, the court stated:
"The organic law is subject to the same general rules of construction as
other laws, due regard being had to the broader objects and scope of the
former, as a charter of popular government. The intent of such an instru-
ment is the prime object to be attained in construing it." In State ex rel.
Norman v. Ellis (1930) 325 Mo. 154, 165, 28 S. W. (2d) 363 the court
stated: "* * * the intention of the law-makers and Constitution-makers
must be gathered when interpreting an act or a constitutional provision.
Law-makers and the people adopting a constitution have a right to put an
interpretation on the words they use which meets their intention." See
also: State v. Hope (1889) 100 Mo. 347, 361, 13 S. W. 490, 8 L. R. A. 608;
State ex rel. Hussman v. St. Louis (1928) 319 Mo. 497, 509, 5 S. W. (2d)
1080; Graves v. Purcell (1935) 337 Mo. 574, 582, 85 S. W. (2d) 543; 1
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed. 1927) 124.
27. Another recognized rule of constitutional interpretation requires the
court to look to the historical conditions and the evil sought to be eradicated
by the provision. In State ex rel. O'Conner v. Riedel (1932) 329 Mo. 616,
626, 46 S. W. (2d) 131, the court stated: "In placing a construction on a
Constitution, or any clause or any part thereof, a court should look to the
history of the times and examine the state of things existing when the
Constitution was framed or adopted, * * *." See also: Hamilton v. St. Louis
County Court (1851) 15 Mo. 3, 23; State ex rel. Boonville v. Hackman(1922) 293 Mo. 313, 240 S. W. 135, 136; State ex rel. Russell v. State
Highway Comm. (1931) 328 Mo. 942, 42 S. W. (2d) 196; 11 Am. Jur. 676-
677, and cases cited thereunder.
28. See notes 11 & 14, supra.
29. See note 11, supra.
30. See note 21, supra.
31. See note 1, supra.
32. See note 1, supra.
33. R. S. Mo. (1939) §§11676, 11596, 11680.
34. In Norris v. Cross (1909) 25 Okla. 287, 105 Pac. 1000, 1012 the
court held that the secretary of state could not be compelled to act in a
particular way, but, though in details he had discretion, mandamus would
lie to compel him to act in some way. The court stated: "* * * after a
careful examination of authorities we have been able to find no case wherein
it was sought to compel a Secretary of State to discharge duties in con-
nection with the submission of a constitutional amendment, or other ques-
tion authorized to be voted upon by the people, where such duties were im-
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The duty of the secretary of state is independent of legislative
authorization. The section makes no mention whatever of action
by the general assembly.35 Nor can it be justifiably argued that
by implication the legislature has the power to approve or dis-
approve the submission, for those who framed and ratified the
section intended that it be independent of legislative acquies-
cence.38 This intent would be effectively defeated 7 and the con-
stitutional mandate would be unenforceable if the duty were
construed to be conditioned upon such legislative action. Further-
more it would render article XV, section 4 nugatory; in effect
the section would then become a mere recommendation to the
general assembly. By reason of. article XV, section 3 the legis-
lature already has power to submit the question at will; the
legal effect of the two sections must have been meant to be
different. To read legislative acquiescence into article XV, sec-
tion 4 would be to fly in the face of recognized rules of constitu-
tional interpretation and the apparent will of the people as ex-
pressed in their constitution.38
H. S. H.
POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO AMEND OR REPEAL
DIRECT LEGISLATION
It is a fundamental principle of our system of representative
government that the legislative department has plenary power to
enact laws and to amend or repeal them, subject only to the pro-
visions of the constitution from which this power arises. During
the first two decades of this century, however, the spirit of gov-
ernmental reform which produced such phenomena as the Pro-
gressive Movement, resulted in the adoption in most of our west-
ern states of constitutional changes designed to reserve to the
people the right to enact legislation directly, independently of
posed upon him by constitutional provision or by statute, and he refused to
act, that the writ [of mandamus] was not allowed."
35. See note 1, supra.
36. See notes 11 & 14, supra.
37. A rule of constitutional construction requires that the courts give
effect to every part of the constitution. 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limita-
tions (8th ed. 1927) 128 states:CC* * * The courts * * * must lean in favor of a construction which will
render every word operative, rather than one which will make some words
idle and nugatory."
38. The writer suggests that article XV, section 3 be revised to ex-
pressly place the duty upon the secretary of state with or without legislative
authorization and also to provide expressly that he may be compelled by
mandamus to submit the question under the periodic provision. This would
obviate all possibility of litigation.
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